

SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND
POVERTY REDUCTION IN
LATIN AMERICAN AND
THE CARIBBEAN

ESTANISLAO GACITÚA
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THE CARIBBEAN



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RACE, POVERTY, AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN BRAZIL

NELSON DO VALLE SILVA

Research about racial exclusion in Brazil is not a novelty, nor is it scarce. It was initiated at the end of the 70's as a reaction to the anthropological/sociological literature dominant at the time, which rejected the hypothesis that racial discrimination could play an important role in the distribution of opportunities in Brazilian society.

In fact, two major hypotheses seem to characterize the "classic" literature that deals with racial relations in Brazil. In the first case, race does not play a significant role in the social mobility process, and the present situation of non-whites is explained basically in terms of their initial position of relative disadvantage (E.g. Freyre, 1993; Pierson, 1955). Much emphasis is placed on the history of slavery of the non-white population and adopting a perspective basically of assimilation, with the belief that, in time, the colored groups will be incorporated into the mainstream of Brazilian society. Even theorists who admit the existence of prejudice and racial discrimination in Brazil believe that these practices are a reflex of class discrimination (Ianni, 1972) or a cultural heritage from the past (Fernandes, 1972). Therefore, it would be considered an occurrence that is in the process of extinction and will be dissolved by the progressive acquisition of adequate human capital by non-white people.

The second dominant hypothesis refers to the supposedly privileged position occupied by the mulatto population in Brazilian society. According to this hypothesis, and associated with the idea of a mulatto "escape hatch" (Degler, 1971), pardos enjoy more opportunities for social mobility than blacks and reach higher economic, educational, and occupational levels. The miscegenation that spread throughout Brazil was important in reducing the difficulty of racial relations, because the discrimination against persons of

"mixed blood" is supposedly less than against black people. Note that this is supposedly the essential aspect that distinguishes the system of race relations in Brazil from that of the United States.

These ideas only began to be questioned at the end of the '70s. Hasenbalg (1979) and Silva (1978; 1980) called the attention to the fact that it is likely that racial discrimination could represent a significant role in the functioning of the labor market, much like exploitation and competition. Instead of considering prejudice and discrimination as an irrational cultural inheritance from the past, these authors suggested that racial stratification is rooted in the actual social structure of Brazil, racial discrimination being a rational reaction to conflict of the groups in competition for scarce social and economic resources.

In other words, these authors argue that race (or, in the Brazilian terminology, "color") is a relevant criterion in the definition of exclusionary strategies that configure the system of inequality, which characterizes Brazilian society.

Following this path, many empirical studies were realized to try to quantify the extent of racial discrimination in the Brazilian labor market. Silva (1978) analyzed the racial differentials in income in the Rio de Janeiro area, using the Brazilian census of 1960. This study presented various conclusions. The first was that, contrary to the above-mentioned hypotheses, blacks and pardos seem to present very similar profiles.

This is particularly true in relation to the findings regarding work and education, but similar results were also obtained in relation to other variables. They arrived at the important deduction that judging blacks and pardos as components of a homogenous "non-white" racial group does not constitute an excessive violation of the statistical reality of these groups.

A second conclusion was to recognize the substantial differences in the economic levels of whites and non-whites, just as when we examine the variables relevant to the process of determining income. While the variation of the differences of income attributed to discrimination in the labor market may be lower than in other places, a substantial portion of these inter-racial differences in Brazil seem to be caused by discriminatory practices. That is, it was demonstrated that although whites appear to be disposed to certain advantages at a lower level of achievement, these advantages are surpassed by superior results in work and education returns enjoyed by *whites*. (p. 152) The final result is that non-whites are only disposed to one advantage relative to whites, either in their initial entrance into the job market or at very low qualification levels, normally in poor locations such as rural areas. Whites are much more efficient at converting their experiences and educational investments into monetary returns, while non-whites suffer increasing

disadvantages in climbing the social ladder. These findings resulted in the rejection of the two principal hypotheses of Brazilian sociological literature: it is not true that pardos behave in a manner different from blacks, nor is it true that a person's race is of little importance in reaching a determined level of income. On the contrary, it was discovered that whites enjoy many more advantages in the job market. Nevertheless, the data also lead us to the surprising conclusion that, at minimum, blacks were slightly less discriminated against than pardos, contradicting the conventional wisdom of the historical sociological literature.

Silva (1986) later amplified this analysis with the intention of including more variables and other regions based on the 1976 data from PNAD. The results confirmed in great part those obtained in previous work. He estimated that, for Brazil as a whole in 1978, close to 33 percent of the difference in income between blacks and pardos could be attributed to discrimination in the labor market. The corresponding number for blacks was 26 percent. So, once again, the surprising result was reached that blacks seem to be less discriminated against than pardos.

Then, Lovell (1989) analyzed the racial inequality in income of workers in all metropolitan regions of Brazil. Using data from the 1980 census, his estimations indicate that the median income of the non-white population is almost half that of the white population. Lovell concludes that, for blacks, 25 percent of the difference in income can be attributed to discriminatory practices, and, for pardos, 32 percent. Lovell observed that non-whites receive differential treatment in the job market, contrary to what Silva (1980) concluded. There exist significant differences between blacks and pardos. Also, it was discovered that income discrimination varies according to region, industrial sector, and occupational position.

Lovell (1994) further demonstrated that the effects of racial inequalities and gender are very complex in that salary differences depending on gender are greater than those according to race in some occupations, while in others the racial factor is more important. Income differences based on gender are greater in occupations of higher status such as technical, professional occupations as well as in some low status jobs (such as unqualified personal services). On the other hand, in certain sectors, such as office work and qualified manual labor, the differences tend to be greater depending on a person's color, not gender. In summary, what these studies have done over the last two decades is demonstrate the significance of exclusionary factors of racial order in the configuration of Brazilian social inequalities.

REFERENTIAL AMBIGUITY, SOCIAL RACE AND MISCEGENATION

Before entering into a more detailed analysis of the actual situation of the racial inequalities in Brazil, it is important to discuss some topics that will allow us a realistic vision of this complex reality. It deals with topics related to the peculiarity of the system of racial identity and of the extensive and intimate interracial contact, fundamentally characteristic of the racial relations in this country. In order to do this, we will use the data of a national study on race and racial preconceptions, realized by the newspaper *Folia de Sao Paulo (Datafolha)*. This study is considered to be the largest and most complete study done in the country.

Lets consider first the arduous question of racial identity. Anthropological work has repeatedly demonstrated that Brazilians can be very imaginative in respect to terminology regarding race/color. *Datafolha's* 1995 study formulated two questions about self-identification of color on the part of interviewees: one open question, in which the interviewee had the liberty to express himself in his own terms, and another question with multiple choice options patterned after those used in the official census. While the open question produced dozens of terms to designate the color of one's skin, there was a considerably high concentration of certain terms. The relative distribution of the responses was the following:

Table 1

Self-identification by color

"BRANCO"	39.0%	"CLARA "	2.0%
"Moreno"	35.0%	Mulato	1.0%
"Moreno" claro	7.0%	"Escura"	1.0%
Pardo	6.0%	"Moreno" escuro	1.0%
Negro	4.0%	Amarelo	1.0%
Preto	3.0%	Outros e DK	2.0%

N.E. Due to particular sense of each color category used in the manuscript original brazilian denominations have been maintained.

The principal problem here seems to be the fact that a large proportion of the Brazilians see themselves as "morenos," this term is not included in the official census terminology. Besides this, there is much ambiguity and uncertainty as to the application of this term, which is used by almost 43 percent of Brazilians. When these "morenos" classify themselves using the official terms, half of them classify themselves as "pardos", and the other half consider themselves white, black, or other.

More disturbing than the use of terminology different from the official terminology is the apparent effect of socio-economic conditions on color identity. The 1995 research by *Datafolha* also included a classification of the color of the interviewee attributed by the interviewer. When we compare the responses of the interviewees with those of the *interviewers*, we encounter significant discrepancies. There are indications that these discrepancies are connected to the socio-economic situation of the interviewees (Silva, 1994), in the sense that the "whitening" responses (relative to the evaluation of the interviewer) tend to come from the better-educated and wealthier interviewees while the "black" responses tend to come from persons of lower socio-economic levels. While of reduced significance, this effect tends to support the correlation between self-classification by color and socio-economic conditions.

Another important question is that of miscegenation and inter-racial marriage. It is a known fact that inter-racial marriage, more common in Brazil than in other multiracial societies, constitutes the main process by which miscegenation continues to occur. Despite the fact that marriage between persons classified in the same color group which are estimated at nearly 80 percent of all married couples – (Berquó, 1991; Lago 1998; Scalon 1992) – the other 20 percent still constitutes a relatively high number. A curious and important consequence of the high rate of inter-racial marriage is that, although the majority of the Brazilian population define themselves mainly as white, the majority of families have at least one person they classify as non-white. So if we classify the "color of family" in terms of the color self-declared by the couple – utilizing the categories white, non-white, and mixed – we obtain the values presented in Table 2. As we can see, in 58 percent of the Brazilian families, at least one of the spouses is not white.

Additionally, there exists an almost symmetrical variation when we consider the economic situation of the family: 78 percent of the lower income families include at least one non-white person in the couple; while in the higher income quintil, this proportion is 25 percent.

Table 2

Color Of Family By Income Level Of Families

INCOME LEVEL OF FAMILIES	FAMILY COLOR			TOTAL
	White	Non-White	Mixed	
1° (20-)	21.9	59.4	18.7	100%
2°	30.4	48.7	14.9	100%
3°	47.7	39.5	12.8	100%
4°	61.0	28.8	10.2	100%
5° (20+)	75.0	15.0	10.0	100%
Total	41.9	44.1	14.0	100%

Source: PPV 1996/1997, Tabulations of the author, Note: Total number of families 25,466,291.

Datafolha's study also contains interesting information about this topic. For example, it was asked if the interviewee had had a boy – or girlfriend or spouse of a different color than his or her own. Nearly 16 percent of the interviewees had married someone of a different color than their own.

Another important topic that *Datafolhas* study permits us to review is the prevalence of prejudice and racial discrimination in Brazilian society. Contrary to what might be expected, considering the importance of the ideology of racial democracy in Brazil, when faced with the question, "Are whites prejudiced toward blacks?" Nearly 90 percent of the interviewees said "yes" and 61 percent qualified the affirmation, adding "very". Moreover, this response does not seem to vary according to color, although there is evidence that the positive responses increase with higher educational levels (Hasenbalg and Silva, 1993).

Datafolhas also dealt with the real experience of discrimination (Table 3). When the question was asked, Do you feel discriminated against due to your color? Seventy-seven percent of the non-white interviewees indicated that they themselves had never experienced discrimination. There are, however, significant differences between black and "pardo" interviewees, the latter recounting much less experience with discrimination than blacks. As much for blacks as for "pardos", the circumstances of discrimination were spread out over an ample spectrum of situations, from discrimination in the workplace to jokes and commentaries.

Table 3

Discriminatory Experiences According to Self-Classification and Color

ONLY FOR BLACK AND "PARDOS": HAVE YOU EVER FELT DISCRIMINATED AGAINST DUE TO YOUR COLOR? IN WHAT SITUATION?	SEX				TOTAL
	Men		Women		
	Blacks "Pardos"	Blacks "Pardos"	Blacks "Pardos"	Blacks "Pardos"	
YES	36	17	37	15	22
-Lost opportunity/work	7	4	10	3	5
-Discrimination in the workplace	6	3	9	2	4
-Discrimination in public places	6	4	5	2	4
-Not accepted by the family of the boy/girlfriend	5	2	3	2	3
-Discrimination by students and professors	8	1	5	2	3
-Commentaries/jokes, etc.	4	2	2	1	2
-Other answers	7	3	8	3	4
-Doesn't know/remember	2	1	2	1	1
NO, NEVER	64	83	63	85	77
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Sample (judicious)	296	650	91	666	1974

Source: Datafolha Study, 1995 – Published by Redefolha.

Finally, I think it is important to note that the elevated levels of interaction between racial groups in Brazil at the same time reflects and causes the very low levels of spatial segregation in Brazilian cities. Telles (1995), utilizing the classic indices of dissimilarity, found the level of spatial segregation not controlled by the socio-economic situation to be around 43 percent in Rio and 41 percent in Sao Paulo. Comparative values in American cities vary between 70 and 90 percent. Additionally, when studying the economic level of the families, the values between the poor in the Brazilian metropolitan areas are much lower than the above-mentioned values, while the levels of segregation in the USA are similar at all income levels.

DEMOGRAPHICS AND LIVING CONDITIONS

The picture of racial relations in Brazil, which combines in complex manner the consciousness of discrimination with the intimate relationships between racial groups, must be completed with a panorama of the inequalities of socio-economic order. As I will attempt to demonstrate, the literature that touches this vast array of racial relations paints the background of a sociological dynamic in which blacks and "pardos" are subjected to disadvantages that accumulate throughout the phases of the individual's life and those disadvantages are transmitted from one generation to the next:

We begin with the racial composition of the Brazilian population. Conducting an analysis throughout time, we observe that, in 1890, the white population comprised a minority of the population at 44 percent. However, between 1890 and 1940, there was a significant increase in the white population due to the immigration of many Europeans around the end of the century, promoting what is called the "whitening" of the population. Upon examining the census of 1940, we verify that whites came to represent 63.5 percent of the Brazilian population. A similar phenomenon occurred with "pardos" in the period from 1940 to 1980, when there was a proportional increase their population. Naturally, at the same time, the proportion of blacks and whites dropped. In 1980, the proportion of persons who declared themselves "pardos" was 38.5 percent, representing a 9 percent increase compared to 1940. In this same period, the white and black populations decreased by 6.2 and 2.8 percentage points, respectively. Since then, a certain stability has been observed in these proportions. So, the data from 1996 (PNAD) reveal that about 55.2 percent of the population calls itself white (2.1 percent less than in 1980), followed by "pardos" at 38.2 percent, blacks at 6 percent, and yellows at 0.6 percent.

These tendencies result from the combination of three basic factors: the difference in mortality rates, fertility rates, and rates of miscegenation. In respect to the first factor, significant race-related differences have been verified in the probabilities of survival during the first year of life and in life expectancy. So, in 1980, infant mortality was 77 per 1000 live births amongst whites and 105 per 1000 amongst non-whites; this last rate corresponds to that observed for whites 20 years before (Tamburo 1987). Similarly, the life expectancy of blacks and "pardos" in 1980 was 59.4 years, compared to 66.1 years for whites. This difference is very close to the difference of 7.5 years observed between these groups in 1950 (Wood and Carvalho 1988; Tamburo 1991). The disparities in fertility are also significant in that, during the highest point of Brazilian population growth, they reached the value of 5.6 children for mulatto women, 5.1 children for black

women, and only 3.5 children for white women. In respect to miscegenation (see Hasenbalg, Silva, and Barcelos, 1989), we examined its impact when we analyzed the racial composition of the families in the previous section.

So, Berquo (1988, pp. 21-22) analyzed the dynamics of the factors that determine the complex racial composition of the Brazilian population, and observed the following:

For the population classified as white: a) the lowest mortality rate, earlier marriages, less infidelity, and higher fertility rates of the white population until 1960 can be thought of as responsible for the quantitative predominance in the total population; b) the increase of racial-mixing, that is, marriages of "pardos" and blacks, and the more accentuated decline of fertility beginning in the 1960s (possibly due to the use of more and improved contraceptives) can be thought of as the reason for the deceleration of the growth rate and the decline of the relative representation in the total population.

For the population classified as black: the highest mortality rate, longest postponement of marriage, increased levels of infidelity (principally in women) increased miscegenation, more sterility and lower fertility up to 1960, can be considered the reason for the low growth rates of this population by the accentuated decline of its relative representation in the total population.

For the population classified as mulatto: although subject to elevated levels of mortality, miscegenation and very high fertility rates, during the entire period 1940-1980, these are the main determinants of the elevated growth rate of this population, and, consequently, of the systematic increase of its relative representation in the total population.

Examining the distribution of population by color and by region in the South and Southeast – the most developed regions – the white population is predominant. For example, in 1996, 85.9 percent of the southern population was white and in the Southeast this percentage was 65.4. In the northeastern and northern regions, the mulatto population dominated at 62.9 percent in the Northeast and 67.4 percent in the North. Analyzing the situation in the cities, it has been observed that, for Brazil, the majority of the urban population is white, above all in the southern and southeastern regions, while in the northern and northeastern regions "pardos" dominate, reflecting in the urban areas the pattern observed for the country as a whole. On the other hand, in the distribution of the rural population, note that in the rural Northeast "pardos" predominant, while in the South and Southeast, the most developed regions, the predominant group is the white, composing the great majority of the rural population in these regions. Above all, this information demonstrates that whites, blacks, and "pardos" are distributed in a very

unequal manner throughout the country, with clear advantages in location for the white population. Note that even comparing the black and mulatto populations, we verify an advantage amongst blacks, with a greater incidence in the Southeast region and in urban areas. These advantages in location are reflected in various aspects of the socio-economic status of these colored groups, such as living conditions, access to public services, education, and work market among others.

Analyzing this data, note that the white group presents a notably superior

Table 4

Access to Public Services and Consumer Goods

PROPORTION OF INHABITANTS WITH:	COLOR OF INHABITANT			TOTAL
	White	Black	Mixed	
- Home trash collection	70.8	53.1	47.8	61.0
- Homes with indoor running water	84.2	61.6	56.1	72.1
- Electric lighting	92.1	81.8	78.0	86.1
- Rustic homes, or rented rooms	3.2	11.9	11.6	7.0
- Homes with refrigerator	81.0	58.5	54.1	69.4
- Homes with television	82.9	64.1	59.4	72.8

profile to that of the other two groups. On the other hand, the black group that, as we saw, enjoys advantages in location relative to the mulatto group, presents a slightly better situation than that of the blacks.

Of course, this situational difference in needs and resources is reflected in the very distinct appropriations of life opportunities of the members of these families. Certainly an important dimension of these differences, that which in large measure will lead to the intergenerational transmission of disadvantages in the distribution of opportunities, is that of individual schooling. Studies about schooling reveal that non-white children complete significantly fewer years of study than whites, even when considering children from the same social origin or family income (Barcelos, 1992 and 1992a; Halsenbalg and Silva 1990; Rosenberg 1987, 1990 and 1991). Examining the 15-19 age group that, according to Brazilian law, must have completed the primary grades, can make one illustration of the educational disparities between whites and non-whites. In 1990, illiteracy in this age group was 4.9 percent amongst whites and 14.4 percent amongst blacks and "pardos". Only 34.8 percent of whites and 15.4 percent of blacks and

"pardos" of this age had completed primary school. Disparities in access to higher education are even more accentuated. In 1996 (see Table 5), the proportion of persons 20 years and older who had completed eleven or more years of study was 20.6 percent among white men, 7 percent among black men, and 8.3 percent among "pardos". The differences amongst women, although less accentuated, are of a similar magnitude. As we will see later, the educational inequalities between whites and non-whites will later be reflected in differential patterns of insertion of these color groups in the occupational structure.

One correlation to this frighteningly low level of general education, which also characterizes the white group, is the early entrance into the labor market. Here the data from the Study of Life Patterns, which refers to the years 1996 and 1997, will help us to show the magnitude of the problem. This study includes a question about whether the individual had worked before, a question asked to everyone over five years of age. Upon analysis of the corresponding responses, we verify that this is a problem that affects more males than females, and impacts significantly the lives of non-whites. At nine years of age, no less than about 12 percent of black and mulatto children report that they have worked, while among whites the corresponding number is half that. Upon reaching 14 years of age, nearly half of adolescent non-white males have worked, while for whites the proportion is one third of that. At 16 years of age, nearly three-fourths of non-white children and more than half of white children have worked, giving a notion of the seriousness of this phenomenon. (See Table 6).

Table 5
Years of Study (%) by Sex and Color of Respondent

YEARS OF STUDY	MEN			WOMEN		
	White	Black	Pardo	White	Black	Pardo
No instruction/Less than 1 year	16.2	24.0	23.4	11.2	25.5	21.0
1 to 3 years	17.0	23.8	25.8	15.7	21.4	23.2
4 to 7 years	36.6	33.9	32.0	35.5	32.3	33.7
8 to 10 years	15.6	11.2	10.5	15.3	11.5	11.5
11 to 14 years	14.4	6.1	7.1	16.4	8.2	9.2
15 or more years	6.2	0.9	1.2	5.9	1.1	1.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: PNAD 96, Tabulation of the author.

Table 6**Incidence (percentage) of Positive Responses to the Question
Have you worked? by Sex and Color of Respondent**

AGE	MEN			WOMEN		
	White	Black	Pardo	White	Black	Pardo
9	6.2	12.3	12.0	0.0	3.0	2.5
10	9.5	9.6	26.5	3.5	1.5	7.0
11	8.9	2.2	28.4	5.6	0.0	9.2
12	18.8	26.6	34.1	7.3	15.1	14.6
13	27.6	30.9	51.5	20.7	28.2	19.9
14	32.0	45.1	19.8	23.3	26.2	20.4
15	39.0	48.9	60.5	23.9	26.8	34.6
16	57.4	75.1	70.9	34.0	60.4	37.9

Source: PPV 98/97 - Tabulation of the author.

POVERTY

According to the previous section, there exists a clear association between one's color and one's probability of being exposed to the situation of poverty. To my knowledge, only one study (Silva, 1994) attempts to focus on this relation.

Therefore, in the following, I will present concrete information regarding employment, which is derived from data collected in the PNAD from 1988, a year of extraordinary symbolic importance as the 100-year anniversary of the abolition of slavery in Brazil. Table 7 presents the distribution of family per capita income by color of the individual, with the types of income defined in terms of fractions of minimum wage. We focus our attention in particular on the first category, that of families whose per capita income is not more than one-fourth of the minimum wage. This is a cut-off point that is undoubtedly very low and indicates an extremely precarious socio-economic situation.

Table 7

Per Capita Family Income by Color of Respondent
Brazil 1988

PER CAPITA FAMILY INCOME	Color of the Person		
	White	Black	Pardo
- Up to 1/4 minimum wage	14.7	30.2	36.0
- 1/4 to 1/2 m.w.	19.2	27.4	26.8
- 1/2 to 1 m.w.	24.2	24.9	20.7
- 1 to 2 m.w.	20.2	12.0	10.6
- 2 to 3 m.w.	8.2	2.7	2.9
- 3 to 5 m.w.	6.5	1.6	1.8
- 5 to 10 m.w.	4.5	0.8	0.9
- 10 to 20 m.w.	1.5	0.3	0.2
- 20 or more m.w.	0.3	0.1	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: IBGE, PNAD-88 Special Tabulations.

Thus, we can prove that the estimated incidence of individuals in this income class for the year 1988 is 23.7 percent of the total. Meanwhile, the proportion of persons in this situation is extremely unequal when we consider color: while an estimated 14.7 percent of the white population is in this situation, the number is more than double for blacks at 30.2 percent population, and-somewhat surprisingly given the generalized notions of their intermediate *status* in Brazilian society-36.0 percent of the mulatto population. A similar pattern can be observed in the "1/2 to 1 m.w." income class, confirming and clearly delineating the correlation between social destitution and color in our society.

In principle, some aspects of the situation of poverty – characteristics of the family structure and its principle members – can interfere and, eventually, account for these differences due to color; for example, the question of region. As stated earlier, the Northeast is the poorest region of the country. By examining the regional distribution of groups of color, we find that half of all "pardos" and almost one in every three blacks reside in this region. In this sense, blacks have more advantages of location in relation to "pardos", since they proportionally much more present in the richest regions of the South and Southeast. Whites, 64.9 percent of which are located

in the most developed regions, enjoy a similar and more pronounced advantage. In this manner, the possibility exists that these pronounced differences in regional distribution of groups of color explain or qualify the incidence of deprivation between these same groups. To test this possibility, we proceed to the statistics on per capita family income by region of residency and color of the individual (Table 8). We see that the discrepancies between blacks and "pardos" appear insignificant. Excluding Rio de Janeiro and the southern region, in all other regions the black group shows a slightly higher poverty rate than the pardo group. This data suggests that the differences between blacks and "pardos" are essentially due to the differences in the spatial/regional distribution of these groups. The regional factor, meanwhile, does not explain-at least taken in isolation-the high rate of poverty within colored groups.

Table 8

**Incidence of Privation (Per Capita Family Income of 1/4 of minimum wage)
By Color and Region of Respondent (1988)**

REGION	PERSON'S COLOR		
	White	Black	Pardo
Río de Janeiro	6.0%	12.7%	13.8%
Sao Paulo	4.0%	12.3%	8.7%
South	15.2%	23.8%	27.9%
Minas Gerais/Espirito Santo	19.4%	37.7%	35.1%
Northeast	38.5%	51.3%	49.5%
North/Central-West	14.0%	26.9%	23.2%

Source: IBGE - PNAD - 88 Special Tabulations.

Another aspect, which could eventually explain the differences in poverty rates with respect to spatial distribution of the population, is the type of residential area. In this sense, blacks have the advantage of location: they comprise 39 percent of the residents of metropolitan areas, with a strong concentration in Rio de Janeiro. In fact, there are more blacks in metropolitan Rio de Janeiro than in the entire rural Northeast. The group with the greatest disadvantage, once again, is the "pardo" group, with one in three members of this group residing in rural areas. This disadvantage is compounded by the combination of the previously examined factors, resulting in the greatest contingent of "pardos" being located precisely in the rural region of the Northeast, representing almost one fourth of the individuals in

this color group. Thus, relating the type of region to the poverty level among groups of color proves to have little power in explaining this characteristic. In fact, while differences according to color seem to decrease in areas with the greatest overall incidence of poverty (the rural areas), they seem to increase in the urban, and especially metropolitan, areas. While whites show a poverty rate of 4.5 percent in urban areas, the rate among blacks is 13.5 percent, and among "pardos" it is 14.6 percent. Clearly, this type of difference in the spatial distribution of the population not only fails take into consideration the differential incidence of poverty, in truth it suggests that these differences are even greater the more urban the areas of residence of the individual.

As well as location factors, some family characteristics seem to be associated to the condition of poverty. In the first place, poor families tend to be larger or have a greater number of economically non-active dependents. Now, along with this aspect we can also find great differences between groups of color. Using the individual as the unit of measurement – and not the family – we verify that the median size of white, black and "pardo" individuals is 4.6, 5.2, and 5.5 members, respectively. When we consider the number of non-active dependents, we find that the individuals in families with a greater number of dependents are of the "pardo" group, with 36.0 percent of them living in families with a maximum of two dependents. The corresponding percentage in the white group is 50.1 percent, while among blacks it is 42.8 percent. On the other extreme of the spectrum, 26.7 percent of "pardo" individuals belong to families with more than five dependents; the corresponding percentage for blacks is 23.1 percent, and for whites it is 11.9 percent.

Although the relationship between the number of dependents and the condition of poverty seems to be clear and powerful-no less than 70 percent of individuals in families with 7 to 10 dependents are poverty-stricken; while the proportion among individuals in families with 11 or more dependents is 87 percent-the differences between the color groups seem significant, although they tend to decline proportionally when the number of dependents within a family increases. Thus, among individuals in families with 7 to 10 dependents, the incidence of poverty amongst whites is 66 percent, while amongst "pardos" it is 71 percent, and amongst blacks 76 percent. These differences begin to change direction for individuals in families with 11 or more dependents, where the proportion of poverty-stricken amongst whites begins to pass that of the "pardo" population.

Studying the poverty rate in relation to age and sex of the head of the family (Tables 9 and 10) verifies that the general picture is not altered: whites have a poverty rate of around half that of blacks and "pardos". Another fact

worth noting is that female –headed households seem to be associated in all groups with a slightly lower poverty rate than that of male heads of household. Therefore, it is probable that female heads of household would be associated with the later stages in the cycle of life –widows or separated heads of household – in which the poverty level tends to be slightly lower.

Table 9

**Relative Rate (%) of Poverty
(Per Capita Family Income of less than 1/4 minimum wage)
By Color of Respondent and Age of Head of Household (1988)**

AGE OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD	PERSON'S COLOR		
	White	Black	Pardo
Under 29 years	14.6	31.0	32.1
From 30 to 39 yrs.	15.6	34.2	39.1
From 40 to 49 yrs.	14.9	30.5	39.0
From 50 to 59 yrs.	12.5	24.6	29.3
60 yrs. and older	12.7	23.7	29.8

Source: IBGE PNAD-88 Special Tabulations.

Table 10

**Relative Rate (%) of Poverty by Color of Respondent and
Sex of Head of Household (1988)**

SEX OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD	PERSON'S COLOR		
	White	Black	Pardo
Male	14.6	30.5	36.2
Female	15.4	28.9	34.9

Source: IBGE PNAD -88 Special Tabulations.

In summary, the above analyses indicate that the greatest advantages in location as well as family structure tend to be enjoyed by the white group, while the greatest disadvantages tend to characterize the "pardo" group. Nevertheless, as we saw, not one of the variables considered was capable of

accounting for the differences in poverty rates between the groups. It is important to emphasize that the same is observed when we consider all of the variables simultaneously (see Silva and Hasenbalg 1993). In particular, the differences between the white group, on one hand, and the black and "pardo" groups, on the other, although reduced in relation to their overall dimension, remain at substantial levels. Naturally, this leads us to believe that the heart of the differences between whites and non-whites has its principal origin in the different capacities of the individuals in these groups to generate their own income; in other words, in racially-based discrimination in the labor market, and, eventually, in the stages preceding this phase of life of the individual.

The topic of participation of racial groups in the labor market is one of the most extensively studied subjects and one that has attracted much attention from researchers. This could not be different, since the determining role that the modalities of insertion into the labor market have on individuals and families is based on class hierarchy and social strata. One study has distinguished two sequential stages of the individual's socio-economic life cycle in the phase corresponding to participation in the market; first, the matter of occupational fulfillment – the "social mobility" stage – in which one enters into competition for the opportunity to be assigned to the positions with better locations within the occupational hierarchy; then, the transformation of the advantages (or disadvantages) in location into income appropriation. In both stages, the available evidence shows non-whites at a competitive disadvantage in relation to whites, subject to the consequences of exclusionary strategies in this competitive process. Following, I will attempt to summarize, using principally information stemming from my own work, the existing evidence in respect to these two life cycle stages of the individual.

SOCIAL MOBILITY

Using the data of the National Study of Domestic Samples (PNAD) of 1976, Hasenbalg (1985) examined the social mobility of whites and non-whites, unfolding the analysis in three stages: (1) the pattern of global intergenerational, occupational mobility; (2) the manner in which the social position of the country influenced the educational fulfillment of the interviewees; and (3) the way in which the education acquired by the interviewees conditioned the fulfillment of positions in the occupational hierarchy. The first conclusion, derived from the comparison of the origins of mobility of

the two groups, was that the non-whites experience a considerable deficit in social ascension, which permits the rejection of the hypothesis of equal opportunities for the different color groups. The patterns of intergenerational social mobility showed that, among people born in the lowest strata of rural occupations, whites have a small advantage in opportunities for ascension. However, the interracial differences in social ascension are greater when considering persons born in the most elevated social strata. Furthermore, not only do the differences in upward mobility grow upon passing to the highest social strata, non-whites are also exposed to much higher probabilities of demotion or downward social mobility. In reference to the change in social position due to education, the most notorious indication was that non-white interviewees showed an educational distribution more concentrated in the base, regardless of the origin of the strata used as reference for comparison. Lastly, in what is said with respect to the conversion of acquired education into positions within the occupational hierarchy, note that in any educational level considered, non-whites are disproportionately concentrated in the inferior occupational positions and that the magnitude of the discrepancies in occupational distribution tends to worsen at higher educational levels. This evidence allows us to conclude that blacks and "pardos" in Brazil:

...suffer a competitive disadvantage in all stages of the process of an individual's social mobility. Their possibilities to escape the limitations of a low social position are less than those of whites of the same social origin, just as it is more difficult to maintain the positions already obtained (Hasenbalg 1988, p. 177).

Calilau (1994) analyses occupational mobility based on the statistical information for heads of household and spouses from the PNAD of 1976 and 1988. His results indicate that, in the two periods observed, the availability of better opportunities benefited whites above all. It is also clear that the proliferation of education in Brazil continues to function in a discriminatory fashion: blacks and "pardos" are having less training opportunities than the whites, which reinforces the inequality prior to entry into competition in the labor market (op. cit., pp. 60-61).

In recent work, Hasenbalg and Silva (1998) discard the constant data from the supplement on social mobility of the 1996 PNAD. In terms of the definitions of the occupational strata used to construct the origin of fluxes in mobility, they adopted a methodology proposed by Pastore (e.g. Pastore and Haller, 1993), using a group of six strata obtained from a metric socio-economic scale elaborated with data from the Brazilian census of 1970.

Chart 1 below represents a summary description of the diverse occupational strata defined as the median value of the index of socio-economic status for 1996, which replicated procedures adopted for the data in the 1970 census. Note that the occupational grouping utilized follows the criteria of social distance (measured by the index of socio-economic status), thus we can think of these strata as strictly measuring differences of socio-economic position. It is also necessary to highlight that social distance increases between groups in proportion with upward moves in the social structure. This is a very realistic characteristic given what is known about the high level of inequalities in Brazilian society. Nevertheless, as seen in the description of the strata, this classification also corresponds to other criteria, particularly the distinction between manual/non-manual labor. It is clear that the type of classification is not inconsequential in the level of results obtained: for example, the fact that the occupational groups 1 and 2 are essentially distinguished by the urban/rural variable, allows us, by construction, to identify the process of rural/urban migration with upward mobility. In this manner, the recent urbanization of Brazilian society is necessarily associated with an improvement in the distribution of positions within the occupational hierarchy.

Chart 1

Occupational Strata, Median Values and Representative Occupations

OCC.* GROUP	STRATA	REPRESENTATIVE OCCUPATIONS	MEDIAN ISS
1	Very low: unqualified rural workers.	Independent farmers and cattlemen; other agricultural workers; fishermen.	2.90
2	Low: unqualified urban workers.	Independent salesmen; guards; servants; Manual labor; traveling salesmen; maids.	6.49
3	Low Middle: Qualified and Semi-qualified workers.	Drivers; construction workers; mechanics; carpenters; painters; electricians.	8.68
4	Middle: Non-manual workers; low-level professionals and small business owners.	Small agricultural business owners; administrators and managers in agriculture and cattle farming; office clerks; retired and traveling salesmen; electronic Repairmen; Armed Forces enlisted.	17.01
5	Upper Middle: Mid-level professionals and mid-sized business Owner.	Cattle farmers; legal advisors and supervisors in Public Service; executives; administrators and managers in the commerce industry; commercial representatives.	27.19
6	Upper: High level professional and big business owners.	Industry businessmen; administrators and managers in the finance industry; engineers; Doctors; accountants; high-level teachers; lawyers; military officials.	44.06

* Occupational.

Table 11
Intergenerational Occupational Mobility
According to Color, 1996 (%)

TYPE OF MOBILITY	COLOR		
	White	Black	Pardo
Upward	55.8	47.8	49.4
Immobile	31.4	39.0	39.6
Downward	12.8	13.2	11.0

Note that the whites have a significant advantage in terms of occupational upward mobility. On the other hand, the two non-white groups experience greater immobility or inheritance of paternal *status*. Lastly, the proportion of those that were downwardly mobile is very similar in all groups. This similarity in the occupational mobility of blacks and "pardos", as differentiated from that of whites, allows the inclusion of these two groups in a category of non-whites in the following analyses. Table 12 below presents the fluctuations in departure from work of the two occupational groups above (of the parents) for the actual occupational groups (of the interviewees).

Table 12
Intergenerational Mobility according to Color, 1996

OCC.* GROUP	COLOR	ACTUAL OCCUPATIONAL GROUP							Δ
		1	2	3	4	5	6		
1	White	30.3	21.6	28.5	10.8	5.5	3.3		
	Non-white	41.9	22.5	24.9	7.0	2.7	0.9	12.5	
2	White	3.3	25.7	27.6	21.0	12.9	9.6		
	Non-white	7.8	30.8	35.3	14.7	7.6	3.8	17.3	
3	White	1.9	17.3	40.7	17.8	13.8	8.4		
	Non-white	5.6	20.3	48.6	15.1	7.4	3.0	14.6	
4	White	4.3	16.1	19.3	27.2	18.3	14.7		
	Non-white	10.7	24.6	27.0	23.8	8.5	5.4	22.6	
5	White	5.3	12.4	12.8	17.7	28.9	22.8		
	Non-white	9.7	16.7	29.2	24.3	14.6	5.6	31.5	
6	White	2.1	8.5	9.4	18.3	23.1	28.5		
	Non-white	5.0	16.8	21.8	20.8	17.8	17.8	26.0	
Total	White	16.4	19.9	27.9	15.9	11.1	8.7		
	Non-white	29.9	23.1	29.5	10.7	4.7	2.1	18.3	

Regardless of the origin of the occupational group used as a reference, the actual occupational distribution of non-whites is more concentrated in the inferior occupational strata. Thus, for example, amongst children of rural manual laborers (Group 1), the proportion of non-whites who inherit the occupational *status* of their parents is significantly higher than amongst whites at 41.4 percent and 30.3 percent, respectively. In this same group of origin, the proportion of children that advanced to strata 5 and 6 (the highest levels), thus experiencing long distance mobility, is 8.8 percent for whites and only 3.6 for non-whites. On the opposite extreme of the occupational hierarchy, considering the occupational distribution arrived at by the interviewees who are the children of high-level professionals and big business owners (Group 6), note that the proportion of whites (38.5 percent) able to maintain this position is much higher than that of non-whites (17.8 percent). This means that blacks and "pardos" who are born into high-status families are face greater exposure to the risk of experiencing downward social mobility and losing the positions obtained by the previous generation.

In reference to the unequal distribution of opportunities for social mobility among groups of color, the data from Table 12 indicate a similar tendency to that observed by Hasenbalg in 1976. Not only the do non-whites have fewer opportunities for upward mobility, the difficulties of social ascension also increase when considering people from the higher strata. This is indicated, in a synthetic manner, by the index Δ of dissimilarity in the last column of the table. This index indicates the proportion of non-whites within each group of origin, which changed position (in this case, higher) so that their occupational destination would equal that of the white group. The Δ increases consistently, from 12.5 amongst children of rural manual laborers, up to values between 26 and 32 percent amongst interviewees the two highest strata.

An even more synthetic form of quantifying these differences in opportunity for social mobility is through the calculation of the difference (that is, through the Δ index of dissimilarities) which would be observed in the event that the non-white group presented the same rate of mobility (that is, the same percentages in each line) as the white group. This way, the dissimilarity observed would be that attributed only to the fact that non-whites were from families in more precarious situations than that observed for whites. Following this procedure, the Δ patterned by the chances of whites would be along the order of $\Delta=6.2$ per cent. This is the parcel of total difference attributed to differences in family origin. As the index of total dissimilarity is of $\Delta=18.3$ percent, this result implies that 12.1 percentage points can be attributed to the differences between whites and non-whites in opportunities for mobility, in favor of the first group. In other

words, close to 2/3 of the total difference is due to the fact that non-whites have a mobility deficit in relation to whites, which are only responsible for a third of the differences of social mobility between the groups.

In summary, independent of the changes that have occurred in social mobility in Brazil since the 1970s, the patterns of social mobility of colored groups reflect differences that parallel those recorded in 1976: non-whites are exposed to fewer chances for social ascension; the difficulty of moving upward increases along with the level of strata origin; and those born into the highest strata are exposed to greater risks of downward mobility.

The second part of the analysis realized by the authors consists of observing how the social position of origin of the interviewees is converted in educational fulfillment, in terms of years of formal education completed. Table 13, with the matrix of transition of the occupational groups of the parents for the levels of education of the interviewees, presents the pertinent information.

Table 13

**Years of Education by Occupational Group of the Parent,
According to Color, 1996**

PARENT'S OCC.* GROUP	COLOR	YEARS OF EDUCATION						Δ
		-1	1to3	4	5 to 8	9 to 11	12+	
1	White	14.3	22.2	28.1	21.1	9.4	5.0	
	Non-W.	36.1	26.5	17.2	14.4	4.4	1.5	26.1
2	White	2.7	8.4	14.7	29.1	25.1	19.8	
	Non-W.	11.0	15.2	17.6	29.9	19.6	6.7	18.6
3	White	2.8	6.4	15.6	33.1	26.0	16.1	
	Non-W.	7.0	13.1	19.2	35.8	18.4	6.6	14.5
4	White	2.9	3.5	11.3	23.7	25.9	32.7	
	Non-W.	8.0	11.8	16.0	26.2	26.7	11.3	21.4
5	White	3.1	3.7	6.8	13.6	25.3	47.4	
	Non-W.	7.1	0.0	10.3	32.9	23.3	17.4	32.0
6	White	0.2	1.8	3.8	7.6	21.9	64.8	
	Non-W.	4.7	3.7	9.3	19.6	38.3	24.3	40.5
Total	White	8.3	13.8	20.3	23.7	17.5	16.4	
	Non-W.	26.3	21.7	17.3	20.3	10.4	4.1	25.9

The data from Table 13 clearly show that, for all strata of origin, as indicated by the occupational group of the parent, the educational distribution of non-white interviewees is considerably more concentrated in the lower education levels. This is particularly accentuated, for example, in the case of the children of non-qualified rural laborers, where 62.6 percent of non-whites do not attain more than 3 years of education, while only 36.5 percent of whites find themselves in this situation. On the other hand, when considering interviewees from the stratum of non-manual labor (Groups 4, 5 and 6), there are enormous differences in opportunities for accessing superior education; in these groups, whites have opportunities two or three times greater than those of non-whites to access university studies.

The index Δ of dissimilarity, in the last column of non-whites in the distinct strata of origin, calls attention to the elevated values of the index as well as to the fact that they are dispersed in the form of a U, presenting the highest values in the extremes of the occupational hierarchy of origin. In the case of the strata of children of unqualified rural workers, the high value of Δ (26.1) is could be due to disadvantages in location of non-whites, who are concentrated more in the rural areas of the Northeast and Central-West, which have the most precarious indicators of education in the country. The inequality of educational opportunities among groups of color diminishes in children of urban manual laborers (Groups 2 and 3) and increases consistently in children of non-manual laborers. All of this indicates that non-white persons born in the highest stratum encounter the most difficulty in the converting class of origin into educational fulfillment. Continuing to standardize data in a similar form as that was used before, the authors verify that, in the hypothesis that non-whites have the same educational opportunities as whites, the discrepancy in the educational results between the two groups would decline to $\Delta = 7.3$ per cent. This the residual portion attributed to the differences in social origins between the two groups. Since the total dissimilarity is around $\Delta = 25.9$ percent, it follows that a discrepancy of nearly 18.6 percentage points is attributable to differences in educational opportunities between the two groups. That is, almost 3/4 of the total discrepancy in levels of education can be attributed to the greater ease with which whites are able to convert social origin into educational fulfillment as compared to non-whites, since barely one fourth of this discrepancy can be attributed to the lower social origin of the latter.

Following, the authors proceed to examine the next stage of the individual social mobility process, which is the manner in which attained education is translated into obtaining positions in the occupational hierarchy. Table 14 informs us of the actual occupational group of the interviewees according to their level of education.

Table 14

Actual Occupational Group by Years of Education,
According to Color, 1996

YEARS OF SCHOOLING	ACTUAL OCCUPATIONAL GROUP							
	COLOR	1	2	3	4	5	6	Δ
Less than 1 yr.	White	48.9	25.9	19.3	4.5	1.2	0.2	
	Non-W.	58.3	21.6	16.0	3.1	1.1	0.0	9.4
1 to 3 yrs.	White	31.1	23.5	35.5	6.2	2.7	0.9	
	Non-W.	35.7	25.6	32.1	3.9	2.4	0.3	6.7
4 yrs.	White	19.6	23.7	41.5	9.4	4.5	1.3	
	Non-W.	16.6	26.8	45.1	7.5	3.5	0.6	6.7
5 to 8 yrs.	White	10.1	25.0	40.2	15.2	6.9	2.6	
	Non-W.	7.2	28.2	44.2	14.7	4.3	1.4	7.2
9 to 11 yrs.	White	2.4	17.9	21.3	31.5	19.4	7.5	
	Non-W.	2.7	18.9	24.9	34.8	13.6	5.1	8.2
12 yrs. +	White	1.0	7.0	4.2	22.6	28.6	36.7	
	Non-W.	1.0	7.4	8.1	26.8	27.3	29.3	8.7
Total	White	15.1	20.3	28.7	16.1	11.3	8.5	
	Non-W.	27.2	23.8	30.9	10.9	4.9	2.3	17.8

The information in Table 14 shows that, in all levels of education, the occupational distribution of non-whites tends to be slightly more concentrated in the lowest occupational stratum. In the case of the persons in the lowest education level-less than 1 year-58.3 percent of non-whites and 48.9 percent of whites are concentrated in the first stratum, rural workers. In the highest educational category, – 12 or more years – the proportion of whites in the highest occupational group (36.7 percent) is slightly more than 7 percentage points higher than that of non-whites. Thus, the differences in occupational distribution of the groups of color according to level of education *are not* very accentuated. The magnitude of these differences is shown by the vales of Δ in the last line of the table, which oscillate between a maximum value of 9.4 and a minimum value of 6.7. The information in the table suggests that non-whites experience a disadvantage in the converting formal education in occupational positions, which may be linked to the processes of racial discrimination the labor market. In spite of this, the data on social mobility from 1996 does not clearly indicate the same pattern of social mobility observed in the data from 1976, in which the magnitude of

the discrepancy in occupational distribution of groups of color tends to deteriorate when passing to higher levels of education.

Following the procedures adopted in the previous stages, the authors calculate an index of dissimilarity for the differences between the groups of color, assuming that non-whites have the same ability to convert education into occupational positions as do whites, along the order of $\Delta = 14.4$ percent. While the total dissimilarity is $D = 17.8$ percent, it is believed that barely 3.4 percent of the total difference is attributable to the discrepancy in ability to convert education into occupation. In other words, more than 4/5 of the total difference between whites and non-whites in occupational returns can be explained via the differences between these groups in the level of education attained, and less than a fifth of the difference is attributable to differences in the occupational returns on the educational investment made. In this manner, the authors (Hasenbalg and Silva 1998, p. 19) conclude that the literature dealing with socio-economic differences according to color in Brazil indicates the existence of a process of accumulation of disadvantages. In this work, we reconfirm the plausibility this theory. Moreover, it seems clear that in today's Brazil the nucleus of the disadvantages suffered by blacks and "pardos" is located in the process of acquiring education. The differences in occupational returns on the investments in education are relatively modest when compared with the differences in educational fulfillment, regardless of the strata of origin. These discrepancies tend to increase as the socio-economic situation of origin improves. Thus, the subject of education seems to present a continuing problem in terms of racial inequalities in our country.

INDIVIDUAL YIELD

One of the most stable empirical facts that has been observed in the analysis of racial differences in income distribution is that, systematically, the median income of blacks and "pardos" is slightly less than half that of whites (i.e. Barrios 1986 and 1987; Barrios *et al.* 1992; Batista and Galvao 1992, Castro and Guimaraes 1993; Chaia 1988; Hasenbalg 1992; Lovell 1989; Oliveira *et al.* 1983; Porcaro 1988; Silva and Lima 1992; Silva 1985; Telles 1990 and 1994). It is not surprising, then, that the data of the PNAD of 1996 once again confirms these repeated observations. It is interesting to observe that the differences according to gender are constant within all of the color groups, with men obtaining incomes close to 50 percent higher than those of women, and, that for both men and women, differences based

on color are stable, with whites earning approximately twice that of blacks and "pardos". Between these last two groups, the difference is around 5 percent in favor of "pardos" (Table 15).

Table 15
Median Income by Sex and Color of Respondent

COLOR	SEX		TOTAL
	Men	Women	
White	757.61	459.20	630.38
Black	338.61	227.13	292.05
Pardo	359.27	234.72	309.66
Total	589.89	370.33	498.57

Source: PNAD 96, Author's Tabulations.

When other aspects of the individual income distribution are examined, the racial differences remain significant. For example, separating the total income distribution into tenths and examining the racial content of each group, we obtain the following picture:

Table 16
Income Distribution by Color in Deciles Brazil (1990, %)

COLOR	DECILE GROUP										TOTAL
	1-	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10+	
White	34.8	40.1	46.7	48.7	52.5	57.9	61.1	66.5	71.7	80.2	56.1
Black	58.0	51.3	44.6	43.3	40.9	36.3	33.7	28.7	24.0	15.9	37.6
Pardo	7.0	8.4	8.6	7.8	6.2	5.5	4.8	4.0	3.0	1.4	5.8
Asian	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.8	1.3	2.5	0.7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: IBGE, PNAD 1990.

This type of comparison shows a uniform behavior, confirming the basic opposition between whites, on one side, and non-whites on the other. In fact, as we go from the poorest decile to the wealthiest, there a systematic increase the proportion of whites and a decrease of non-whites. Thus, while the lowest decile in the proportion of whites is a little more than 1/3, in the highest decile, the proportion of whites is 80 percent. This last information

also suggests that we must not exaggerate the severity of income differences along racial lines. Likewise, when we separate those with higher incomes, the proportion of non-whites is not negligible. For example, Albuquerque (1994), examining the racial composition of the highest income percentile in 1988, concluded that blacks and "pardos" comprised 10.3 percent of the total group. Alternatively, we can investigate the distribution of income within each color group. Calculating the distribution in quartiles within each color group, starting with the data of the PNAD of 1996, we obtain the following results, which eliminate the effect of the differences in size of each of the color groups:

Table 17

**Distribution (in Quartiles) with Positive Income,
According to Color**

COLOR	QUARTILE			
	1-	2	3	4+
White	19.4	21.3	27.1	32.2
Black	34.6	28.9	22.4	14.1
Pardo	35.7	27.9	21.8	14.5

Source: IBGE, PNAD 1996.

Here, once again, the similarities between blacks and "pardos" are evident. For both groups, close to 35 percent of the members find themselves in the first quartile, at the same time that 14 percent of are in the highest quartile. However, this last figure contrasts with the corresponding rate of nearly one third amongst whites, which is a rate that should not be overlooked.

In the attempt to pinpoint the intergenerational mechanisms responsible for the racial differences in individual income distribution, Silva (1994) adjusts a series of econometric-type models of the diverse stages of the individual's socio-economic life cycle. The results obtained offer some important indications about the nature of these differences. In the first place, the author examined the role of parental background in the explanation of interracial differences. Parental background is, in great part, responsible for the educational level of the individuals. Even more importantly, it affects the level of income in a direct manner, even when the educational level of the individual is included in the model, which indicates the importance of

other, non-educational family resources in the determination of the economic consequences. These other family resources can include factors such as higher levels of ability, better position in the social network, or direct inheritance of property.

The introduction of parental background in the analysis also had two consequences for the outcome. First, the interracial differences in the educational returns, which initially present an advantage for whites, seem to return to zero and become insignificant. That is, it seems that the interracial differences observed, can be explained by, non educational family resources (quantity) referred to above. Second, the only significant contrast was that which differentiated the whites from non-whites in terms of experiential returns in the work market. Therefore, the advantages of the whites seem to be related to better career trajectories.

Upon attempting to break down discrimination in the labor market in terms of occupational and salary discrimination, the result is that occupational fulfillment is determined in great part by the individual's education level, an indication of the centrality of educational demands in occupational placement. In the same manner, interracial discrepancies also depend on differences in educational returns, confirming the above-mentioned results obtained by Hasenbalg and Silva (1998). Nevertheless, in view of the results obtained by introducing parental background, it seems plausible that the majority of the differences in occupational returns on education can be contaminated by differences of other family resources.

Overall, the situation in Brazil seems to be similar to that described by Blau and Duncan (1987) for the United States, with an existence of a double handicap for non-whites. They are less than "efficient" in converting their human capital into higher incomes, just as the advantage of the paternal achievements are not well converted into advantages for the new generation of children as in the case of whites. The available evidence indicates a clear presence of racially based discriminatory mechanisms, which exist throughout the entire process of individual socio-economic fulfillment. It is also important to note that the measurement of this discrimination is truly just an *inexplicable* difference between the coefficients of the equations of the determination of status. That is, it is a certain manner of *quantifying* differences between racial groups in the process of social fulfillment. This quantification does not provide us with an explicit model of the *mechanisms* of discrimination, nor does it explain how the subordinate groups react. For example, when it is observed that racial differences in returns on educational investments exist, we are not certain if this is due to discriminatory mechanisms in the labor market or if these differences reflect other factors, such as differences in the quality of education received. That is, it is possible

that less education expresses precisely a discouragement amongst non-whites due to the lowest returns they receive. Another example: do the differences observed in returns on experience express a lower position in a line of general promotions, or is this due to a systematic exclusion from certain high-status occupations, such as medicine or engineering? Or, what role do the non-educational family resources, such as family, friend, or so-called "cultural capital" networks, play? In other words, the analytical models utilized do not permit us to specify the function of the exclusionary mechanisms of discrimination, nor does it specify the ways in which the subordinate groups react and make decisions regarding the expectations that a discriminatory treatment will be received in the future. In this last sense, it is good to recall that, in part, social inequalities probably reflect adapting mechanisms for precaution and psychological protection in anticipation of encountering unjust treatment throughout life.

PROGRAMS TO COMBAT RACISM

In the previous sections, I attempted to show that rather peculiar ingredients combine to create the Brazilian case. On one hand, not only do we have evidence of the operation of racist mechanisms of social exclusion, but also a generalized perception of the reality of racial prejudice, which is shared by 90 percent of the entire population.

On the other hand, personal experience with discrimination seems to affect only a small number of non-whites, and interaction between racial groups is intense and non-conflictive, involving a relatively high level of interracial marriage and miscegenation. These characteristics also define a system of specific racial relations that have a definitive effect on the possibilities and forms of action and policies for combating racism.

In contrast to other multiracial societies, racism in Brazil developed through social practices and daily discourse, without recognition by the judicial system and being denied by the official discourse on nationality. It is what is called a racism of attitudes (Guimaraes, 1998). This system is supported by two basic social institutions: in the first place, in the subjectivity of the classification system, in which color substitutes the notion of race, and racial identity is fluid, relational, and socially determined, based not on discrete categories but on color continuum. Ambiguity and contingency are the characteristics of this system. In the second place, it is supported in the legitimization of the asymmetrical treatment based on social class. As recalled by Guimaraes (1998, pp. 108-109), "the social classes in

Brazil, in contrast to those of the United States, are considered legitimate basis for unequal treatment and opportunity among people... the charisma of class in Brazil is predominant above all others, in that it is associated with widely-accepted discriminatory attitudes and conduct which are socially legitimized. Moreover, given the great social inequalities between whites and non-whites, it is possible to discriminate openly against blacks, "pardos", and north-easterners without explicitly evoking the stigmas of race, color, or ethnicity." In Brazil, racism can always be denied and absorbed as an expression of class discrimination.

It is in this context that anti-racist actions exist in Brazil. Very recently, the subjects of affirmative action and promotion of ethno-cultural diversity have been the object of a series of debates and articles (Guimaraes 1996; Telles 1996 and 1997; Contins and Sant' Ana 1996, Martins 1996; Paes and Barros and Mendonça 1996; Souza 1998). At the governmental level, diverse consultative support structures for the population or the Afro-Brazilian culture were initiated. The federal government, for example, created the Palmares Foundation. The State plan gave rise to the Special Secretary of Defense and Promotion of Black Populations, of the State of Rio de Janeiro (today already extinct), and the Counsel for Defense of the Black Community, an institution of the government of Bahia. These institutions have demonstrated relatively innocuous behavior, suggesting a more symbolic than active function:

On the other hand, diverse non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have shown their dedication to combating racism. Perhaps inscribing in the private order, and thus avoiding the inherent dilemmas of formulating public politics endow these organizations with greater dynamism. Two principals of action are under consideration by these organizations.

Legal Assistance: Action destined to provide orientation and judicial support for complaints of discriminatory treatment. The best known of these programs, which has the financial support of foreign agencies, is Racism SOS. This program, created by the Municipal Counsel of Blacks of Vitoria (State of Espiritu Santo) within the Municipal Secretary of Citizenry and Justice. Despite its name, is not aimed at only assisting the black population. Racism SOS is an umbrella organization for some other NGOs, of which the most dynamic are the Center of Assistance to the Black Population (CEAP), in Rio de Janeiro, and the Geledes Institute of the Black Woman, in Sao Paulo. These NGO make investments for a number of civil indemnity cases: for moral damage and for cases of racial discrimination, in particular those which expose the victim to public slander, such as the case of theft suspects in supermarkets or shops (Carneiro 1998). The legal actions against pre-conceived and discriminatory acts have, nevertheless, had more of an effect of

publicizing and bringing up for discussion this problem in Brazilian society – which represents an extremely beneficial novelty in the fight against racism (See an interesting analysis by Guimaraes, 1998) – of making it follow the letter of the law. It is well known that racial discrimination is a non-bail crime in Brazil. With such Draconian legislation, it is always possible to transmute racial discrimination in to class discrimination, making it difficult to condemn someone for the crime of racism.

Educational Support: Programs designed to finance studies, and promote social mobility along with the creation of role models for Afro-Brazilians. There currently exist diverse initiatives of this type. The first to appear was the "Entrance Exam of the Steve Biko Cooperative," a preparation course for the entrance exam to access higher education, created in Salvador (Bahia) at the beginning of the 90s, through the initiative of a group of black university students. The same students administrate the classes, which are financed by a symbolic tuition fee charged to the students. The professionals involved do not receive salaries or any other benefits or remuneration. The target population of this program is black students with low acquisition resources, this criteria being established in terms of a family income no greater than two minimum wages. The current program assists 150 youths and has a waiting list of more than 300 candidates.

Inspired by this model, in the middle of the 90s, a program called "College Entrance for Blacks and Needy" was created in Rio de Janeiro. As its name suggests, it does not assist only the black population. This system was also copied in other states, like São Paulo and Minas Gerais. Along the same line, the federal government announced in April of 1999 a program of educational reinforcement to increase the number of black students in the universities. Linked to the Secretary of State of Human Rights, the program starts from the diagnosis that the "low index of passing rates of blacks in the entrance exams is one of the causes of the racial inequalities in the country" and attempts to support entrance exam courses aimed toward poor students, with priority for blacks. Clearly expressing the central dilemma of anti-racism public policies in Brazil, the quota system for non-white students was thrown out because "the quotas cause the perpetuation of prejudice by establishing two distinct classes of students... what we need are affirmative responses which equalize the culture and knowledge of youths in white and non-white communities." (*Jornal de Brasil*, 29/04/99).

As we saw, although these official or private programs are nominally directed toward the Afro-Brazilian population, they do not exclude individuals of other racial or ethnic groups. That is why measures of affirmative action require clear notions which define who can benefit from them, presupposing the existence of active and politically defined ethnic groups.

Thus, in the Brazilian case, one of the basic characteristics is precisely the fluidity and subjectivity of racial identity, diluted in a continuum of color – which has impeded the mobilization around a common identity, which would provide a foundation for politically organized action. In this context, in the foreground of the debate over anti-racist actions is the dilemma of ethics in reference to the categories or groups that may benefit from public policies in a country formally ruled by democratic and universal laws. As Sansone argues, in the case of Brazil, it is extremely complicated, if not impossible, to determine who comprises – and, above all, who does *not* comprise – part of the favored group. "Who would be the passable 'blacks' to be contemplated by measures inspired in the affirmative action in Brazil? Those who define themselves or fight as such? Those who feel racially discriminated against? Besides, does not creating a rigid category of blacks go directly in contrary to the destabilization of the meanings in respect to color, contributing to strengthen the stereotypes that 'all blacks are equal'?" (Sansone 1998, p. 773).

In finishing, I would like to indicate that I believe a reason of practical order exists which compels the *universal* character of the anti-racist public policies in Brazil. It is the fact that, as we saw, a definition of a public target for these policies would involve, probably, the inclusion of the great majority of Brazilian families. Since universal programs normally aim to benefit the most needy, the target population would be composed mostly of families with non-white members. Recall that 80 percent of the families in the lowest income sector are non-white or mixed. Given this, in Brazil it may not be compensatory to establish public *affirmative* action programs, given the necessary amplification of the coverage of the target population. The political cost of defining an action oriented toward the non-white group would probably be greater than the economic cost of opting for universalism.

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